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The proliferation of overlapping free trade agreements (FTA) in the recent years has led to hub-and-spokes 
(HAS) throughout the world. Being avid subscribers to FTAs, many countries in the Asia-Pacific region 
including the USA, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and Australia have become trade hubs to 
their partners who are in turn relegated to spoke status. In this paper, we question whether being a hub is 
welfare optimal for a small and open economy like Singapore compared to membership in a single bilateral 
FTA or a multi-member free trade zone. Within this context, we use a computable general equilibrium 
model to examine the welfare implications of the triangular trade relationship of the USA, Singapore and 
Japan. This is facilitated by the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement, the USA-Singapore 
Free Trade Agreement, and a hypothetical USA-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement. The analysis is 
extended to incorporate “super-hub” effects; that is, the spoke countries can be trade hubs in other HAS 
systems. The experiment reveals that hub status generates positive welfare gain and is the highest 
Singapore can get from the trade configurations considered. Meanwhile, Japan loses more than the USA 
when both are relegated to spoke status. These findings prove robust under different market structures and 
production technologies, deeper economic integration, “super-hub” effects, as well as, uncertainty in the 
key model parameters and the extent of trade liberalisation shocks. 
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1. Introduction 
The growth of free trade agreements (FTA) worldwide has accelerated since the mid-1990s. By March 
2006, there are 193 regional trade agreements (RTA) reported to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), of 
which 66% or 127 are FTAs in force under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause.
1 If services agreements and partial agreements are 
ignored, about 93% of RTAs are FTAs (WTO, 2006). Up to the early 1990s, FTAs were, with only a few 
exceptions, a set of non-intersecting areas.
2 However, an increasing number of countries and even RTAs 
have become members of more than one FTA, placing them at the centre of two or more “overlapping” 
preferential trade areas. Analysing an FTA in isolation generates conclusions that have little to speak about 
these networks of FTAs and may even mislead on the welfare impact of that FTA under scrutiny. 
The hub-and-spokes (HAS) concept, which is prevalently used in the transportation literature and first 
introduced to international trade as a “two-sided triangle” by Wonnacott (1975), is a useful framework for 
unravelling this noodle bowl of FTAs. The HAS is unique to FTAs because there is no restriction on the 
number of FTAs a region can sign. As a result, the region acts like a “hub”, linking up several free trade 
areas and trading on preferential terms with every “spoke” partner. To facilitate further discussion, we 
identify a HAS to be “pair-wise”. That is, this system arises as the hub facilitates trade between a pair of 
regions. To illustrate, suppose a hub-aspiring Country  j  has bilateral FTAs with n  countries. Any one of 
the n  countries, say Country i  should then have less then  1 − n  bilateral FTAs with the rest (excluding its 
trade pact with  j ) so that, at any time, country  j  would be serving its hub role with respect to country i  
and at least one other country. 
The HAS introduces an extra dimension of FTAs which is not captured when we analyse a single 
agreement. The spoke countries will have less market access than the hub, because the hub enjoys 
preferential access to all spokes but each spoke has preferential access to the hub only. Thus a HAS 
arrangement effectively creates two layers of discrimination instead of one as in the case of a single 
bilateral. Consider Regions  A,  B  and C . With a  B A−  FTA, C  would have poorer access to B  
                                            
1 While the WTO/GATT advocates non-discrimination in trade, there are exceptions to this fundamental principle. 
Paragraphs 4 to 10 of Article XXIV, GATT allows for RTAs, which facilitate trade and do not raise trade barriers on non-
members. The Enabling Clause provides similar exceptions that apply to agreements among developing countries and it 
allows a partial free trade across a subset of goods. 
 
2 As of March 2006, there are 10 CUs compared to 127 FTAs notified to the WTO.   3
compared to  A. In a HAS with  B A−  and  C A−  FTAs, not only will Spoke C  have poorer access to 
B  than Hub  A, Spoke B  also has poorer access to C  compared to Hub  A. When two or more HAS 
intersect, the discrimination becomes multilayered (Lloyd and Maclaren, 2004). One also has to consider 
the costs linked to inefficiencies insofar as HAS bilaterals are inconsistent (imagine administering multiple 
and usually complex sets of tariffs and rules of origin) and greater rent-seeking waste. The hub benefits 
because of the preferences it gets in each spoke market in competition with all other spokes, and because 
of its advantage in attracting investment as the only location with duty free access to all the participating 
countries (Wonnacott, 1996a). 
Past case studies based on the HAS concept include Kowalczyk and Wonnacott (1992) on USA trade 
policy in the Americas, Wonnacott (1996b) on USA-Canada-Europe trade relations and Busse (2000) on 
the EU’s HAS strategy in East Europe, South Africa and Latin America. All these studies are optimistic 
about the hub’s welfare and the contrary for spokes, although as Busse pointed out, the latter may have 
consented to the economic integration because of non-economic gains. The EU FTAs, for example, 
provide East European countries a better chance of securing full membership in the union. They also keep 
the USA’s influence in the Americas in check. Early theoretical works on the HAS include Kowalczyk et 
al (1992a) who use real income functions to measure the terms of trade and volume of trade effects of 
overlapping FTAs, and Krugman (1993) who demonstrates hub formation in the presence of asymmetric 
transportation costs and increasing returns in production. Recent contributions to the literature include 
Deltas, Desmet and Facchini (2005) and Hur (2006). Using a product endowment model, Deltas el al 
proposes that a HAS arrangement leads to a form of arbitrage, which gets translated into excess trade 
through the tariff-free hub, benefiting the latter. Hur demonstrates that hub status is coveted regardless of 
whether there is excess trade through it. 
The purpose of this paper is to conduct a comparison study of the welfare returns from different 
trading regimes that of a single bilateral, a HAS and a free trade zone comprising all the HAS participants. 
Within this context, we examine the triangular trade relations of the USA, Singapore and Japan. The 
aforementioned configurations would arise from the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement 
(JSEPA), the USA-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA) and a hypothetical USA-Japan EPA. 
Estimating the effect of any configuration of FTAs on any participant, outsider and the world at large is a   4
computational challenge, because more than one country can be a trade hub and any country can assume 
the roles of hub and spoke at the same time given the wide repertoire of FTAs in the real world. We meet 
this challenge by utilising a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for a counterfactual analysis. 
Past CGE studies on HAS were conducted by Brown, Kiyota and Stern (2004) on the USA and Japan 
FTAs, Zhai (2006) on alternative HAS in Asia, rotating between Japan, China and the ASEAN as potential 
hubs, and Das and Andriamananjara (2006) on the economic effects of a HAS in the Western Hemisphere 
centred on a Chilean hub and a more comprehensive regional FTA, the Free Trade Area of the Americas. 
In the next section, we survey the USSFTA and JSEPA, and discuss whether a USA-Japan EPA is 
on the horizon. In Section 3, we introduce the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model and 
database, and explain how they are implemented in our analysis. This is followed by a presentation of 
our scenario design, which helps to account for the influence of the other FTAs that Singapore, the 
USA and Japan belong to. We call this “super-hub” effect, because, by the definition of pair-wise 
HAS, these countries of primary concern would each serve as trade hub to more than one pair of 
countries given their current portfolios of FTAs.
3 Our design thus allows us to analyse any trade 
configuration in which not one but many of the participants are concurrently trade hubs. Table 1 
summarises the FTAs concluded by Singapore, the USA and Japan since 2001. 
Table 1:  FTAs involving Singapore, the USA and Japan (2001 – 2006) 
Bilateral FTAs  Date of Entry 
Into Force 
Bilateral FTAs  Date of Entry 
Into Force 
FTAs of Primary Interest  Other Singapore FTAs 
Japan-Singapore*  Nov 2002  Singapore-New Zealand*  Jan 2001 
USA-Singapore*  Jan 2004  EFTA-Singapore*  Jan 2003 
USA-Japan Hypothetical  Singapore-Australia*  Jul  2003 
Other US FTAs  Singapore-India* Jun  2005 
USA-Chile*   Jan 2004  Korea-Singapore* Mar  2006 
USA-Jordan* Dec  2001     
USA-Australia* Jan  2005  Other Japan FTAs 
USA-Morocco*  Jan 2006  Japan-Mexico*  Apr 2005 
Source: WTO, 2006. Note: (1) The EFTA consists of Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. (2) Only 
FTAs that entered into force since 2001 and are reported to the WTO are listed above. (3) Members in FTAs with 
asterisk (*) have also established among themselves services agreements allowed under GATS Article V. 
 
In addition, we will quantify the barriers to services trade that arise due to regulatory measures and use 
them to determine the welfare effects of deeper integration. The inclusion of "super-hub" effects and 
                                            
3 Lloyd and Maclaren (2004, 459) also refer to countries or RTAs with a large number of spokes due to their involvement in 
multiple FTAs as “super-hubs”.   5
varying depth of integration in our experiment can be regarded as robustness checks of the model results. 
Along this line of thought, we also run our experiment under different market structures – perfect 
competition and “large group” monopolistic competition. In Section 4, we report the model results and 
discuss their implications. In Section 5, we analyse how sensitive these results are if model parameters and 
shocks are uncertain.
4  In Section 6, we conclude. 
2. Singapore-USA-Japan Trade Relations  
2.1  USA-Singapore Free Trade Agreement 
The USSFTA, entered into force on 1st January 2004, was the first free trade pact concluded between 
the USA and an Asian country. This Agreement sets out the obligations of both parties to liberalize 
bilateral trade through the elimination of import tariffs, export taxes, trade restrictions and processing fees 
for originating goods. Liberalisation of services trade would include lower entry barriers for retail banking, 
harmonised standards for licensing and certifying professional service providers (especially architects and 
engineers), greater mobility for business visitors and professionals, as well as, mutual access to public 
telecommunications networks. Both parties are also committed to a wide range of issues including 
heightened intellectual property (IP) protection, better foreign investment facilitation, dispute settlement 
procedures, competition policy, environmental protection, and mutual recognition of conformity 
assessments for telecommunications equipment.  
Prior to USSFTA, 44 percent of the electronics and IT products, 74 percent of chemical and 
petrochemical products, 85 percent of processed foods, 52 percent of instrumentation equipment and 70 
percent of textiles and apparel originating from Singapore were dutiable by the USA. Post FTA, the latter 
lifts tariffs on 92 percent of Singapore exports with immediate effect and the remainder will be phased out 
by 2014. Since the relatively open Singapore can offer few tariff concessions in return, much of the 
negotiations over the FTA concern access to her services market. The impediments to services trade rarely 
take the form of border measures. They are often embedded in domestic regulations, so liberalisation may 
entail reforms. Under the USSFTA, each country is committed to treat the other country’s services 
suppliers at par with its own suppliers or other foreign suppliers under like circumstances. There will be no 
requirement for local presence as a condition for the cross-border supply of a service. Market access 
                                            
4 These extensions to our analysis provide a comprehensive touch that is crucial in rendering CGE findings credible.   6
commitments are also given for a wide range of services including construction, telecommunications, 
distribution such as wholesaling, retailing and franchising, financial services such as banking and 
insurance, engineering, and professional services. 
2.2  Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement 
Negotiations between Japan and Singapore for an Economic Partnership Agreement were concluded in 
October 2001 and the JSEPA came into force on 30 November 2002. Unlike the USSFTA, not all products 
enjoy zero-tariff concessions. Although Singapore grants zero tariff rates on all Japanese imports as of 
entry into force of the EPA, Japan increases its zero-tariff commitments from 34 percent (under the WTO) 
to only 77 percent of total tariff lines. Even so, the percentage of Singapore’s exports entering Japan tariff-
free will rise from 84 percent to approximately 94 percent post-JSEPA. Out of the 6938 zero-tariff 
concessions offered by Japan, 6928 will take immediate effect, while the remaining 10 petrochemical 
products will be liberalised by 2010 on a gradual basis. The sectors that benefit include petroleum 
products, electrical and electronic products, chemicals, plastic products, pharmaceuticals, instrumentation 
and transport equipment, and fabricated metal products. 
The number of service sectors which the country concerned will make regulations more transparent is 
increased from the commitment made under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) by both 
parties.
5 Japan commits an additional 32 sectors, totalling 134 of the 155 services sectors classified under 
GATS. For Singapore, an additional 77 sectors are committed beyond GATS, leading to increased 
transparency in regulation for 139 service sectors. Examples of sectors involved are business services, 
telecommunications, health-related and social services, distribution, finance, education, environmental 
services, and transportation.  
2.3  Prospects of a USA-Japan EPA 
Tapping bilateral channels is not new to USA-Japan trade relations. Past engagements between the two 
countries include the 1985 Market-Oriented Sector-Specific (MOSS) talks aimed to improve market access 
for American firms in the Japanese market and the Semiconductor Trade Agreement (STA) of 1986 under 
which a market share target was set for foreign semiconductor consumption in Japan. In 1989, the 
                                            
5 The GATS, entered into force in January 1995, extends the most favoured nation (MFN) treatment to services trade among 
all the WTO members and is the first multilateral agreement of this nature. It ensures transparency and predictability of rules 
and regulations pertaining to and promotes progressive liberalisation of services trade. Some 140 economies at present are 
GATS members and, to varying degrees, have assumed commitments in individual service sectors.   7
Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) was formed to address macroeconomic policies and Japanese 
business practices as barriers to trade. Agreements such as to deregulate the Japanese distribution system 
were subsequently reached in 1990. However, the SII was ended in 1993 to make way for a USA-Japan 
Framework for a New Economic Partnership, which calls for significant reduction in Japan’s global 
current account surplus and addresses issues such as foreign direct investment in the eastern archipelago. 
However, negotiations collapsed from a lack of consensus over the quantitative targets for USA exports to 
Japan. Currently, a framework known as the Japan-USA Economic Partnership for Growth is in force. 
Inaugurated in 2000, it involves regular intergovernmental dialogue on specific fields such as regulatory 
reform, competition policy and investment. Further economic cooperation through an Economic 
Partnership Agreement is therefore not implausible.  
The possibility heightens as both countries are no strangers to the practice of preferential trade. The 
USA began to establish FTAs since 1988 and currently has a portfolio of seven agreements reported to the 
WTO. Japan also became more receptive of preferential trade pacts after joint studies with South Korea (in 
1998), Mexico (1999), and Singapore (2000) concluded in favour of bilaterals (Hatakeyama, 2002). The 
country now has EPAs with Singapore and Mexico, and is currently exploring or negotiating EPAs with 
South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines (METI, 2006).  
While the formation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) motivated Japan to 
launch an EPA with Mexico and move production facilities there to secure better access to the North 
American market, the recent safeguard tariffs imposed by the USA on steel imports (which hit Japan but 
exempted NAFTA partners) shows that Japan is still at risk of being discriminated.
6 Furthermore, Japanese 
firms that lack the resources to shift their production to Mexico, such as the textile manufacturers in East 
Asia, will continue to suffer (Hook et al, 2005). During the 43rd Japan-USA Business Conference held in 
November 2006, Nippon Keidanren, also known as the Japan Business Federation, called for a joint study 
for a Japan-USA EPA amid concerns that the Japanese businesses are losing their competitiveness to their 
counterparts in Singapore, Chile, Australia, Canada and Mexico in the USA market (Nippon Keidanren, 
                                            
6 The safeguard measure was imposed in March 2002 under Section 201 of the 1974 Trade Act. Three-year tariff rates of 8 
to 30 percent were applied on a range of steel imports. These tariffs were lifted in December 2003 when Japan and other 
affected countries successfully petitioned the WTO under the dispute settlement mechanism.   8
2006).
7 This situation will worsen when the USA-Korea FTA is concluded and brought into effect. An 
USA-Japan EPA can also provide a counterweight to rising economic power China in East Asia and boost 
investor confidence in Japan given its enhanced trade relations with the USA (Bergstern, 2004). According 
to Bradford and Lawrence (2004), there are gains of about 3% of total GNP for Japan from any initiatives 
that could produce convergence between its high prices and the much lower levels that prevail in the USA 
and other industrialised countries. For the USA, an EPA with a major trading partner, especially a large 
purchaser of its agricultural products, would be very attractive. Moreover, an agreement that benefits Japan 
also strengthens the most important USA alliance in the region and helps to sustain political support for 
American engagement in East Asia. 
However, the USA-Japan EPA seems as remote as twenty years ago when the then USA ambassador 
to Japan, Mike Mansfield mooted the idea. A major challenge that has to be overcome is the domestic 
resistance in Japan to liberalise its non-competitive agricultural sector and key services sectors, which the 
USA would likely require in order to conclude the EPA. The strong opposition is partly due to food 
security concerns and a weak Japanese agro industry (Hatakeyama, 2002). Furthermore, there are concerns 
about the impact on the global trading system when two of the largest economies give each other 
preferential treatment (Schott, 2004). In a different perspective, an USA-Japan EPA can spur the currently 
moribund APEC prospects for achieving “free and open trade and investment” within the region by 2010, a 
target set in the 1994 Bogor Declaration. For the same reason that a trade bloc of two hegemonies arising 
from the USA-Japan EPA hurts the rest of the world (RoW), it also garners support from outsiders to 
resume multilateral negotiations. Furthermore, an EPA reduces the risk that the current FTA strategies of 
the USA and Japan will create two mega trade blocs in Asia-Pacific, an outcome that can create 
instabilities in overall relations among countries in this region.  
If a USA-Japan trade pact were to be established, what aspects should be covered? The USA still 
imposes substantial tariffs on Japanese goods such as pickup trucks and other commercial vehicles (25 
percent), titanium sponge and wrought titanium materials (15 percent), bearings (4.4 percent to 9.9 
percent), and flat-screen TVs (5 percent). On the Japanese side, goods such as cables (4.8 percent), plastic 
                                            
7 Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) is an economic organization established in May 2002 by amalgamation of 
the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations and the Japan Federation of Employers' Associations. Its membership of 
1,662 comprised 1,351 companies, 130 industrial associations, and 47 regional economic organizations as of June 2006. It is 
one of the three major economic organisations in Japan, the other two being the Japan Chambers of Commerce and Industry, 
and the Japan Committee for Economic Development.   9
products (3.9 percent to 4.8 percent), and aluminium products (4.1 percent) are subject to tariffs, and since 
there are no domestic substitutes for these products, the costs incurred by the importing companies are 
increased and their profits are squeezed. Thus the dismantlement of tariffs remains a vital, core element of 
the EPA. However, the agreement is expected to also resolve ongoing issues such as the exemption of 
nationals from visa requirements, mutual recognition of patents, and a hassle-free system through which 
Japanese firms can help enhance the security of the import supply chain into the USA. For an USA-Japan 
EPA to take off, measures have to be taken to enhance the competitiveness of the Japanese agricultural 
sector so that it can survive the competition brought by foreign producers in the domestic market. The 
Japanese government should also liberalise legal services, education, healthcare, finance, civil aviation, 
and energy services - sectors which the American business community is interested in. As a step forward, 
an agreement on services trade under GATS rules should be explored (Hatakeyama, 2002).  
3.  Model, Database and Experimental Design 
3.1  The GTAP Model 
The framework used in this study is the multi-region GTAP model (Version 6.2) developed by the 
Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University.
8 Each region in the model has three types of 
economic agents: private households, firms and the government, and is endowed with primary factors that 
can be disaggregated up to five categories: skilled and unskilled labour, natural resources, capital and land. 
The model assumes neoclassical behaviour on the part of agents. Labour and capital are perfectly mobile 
between sectors in each region, while natural resources and land are sluggish in adjusting to changes in 
their relative returns. In addition, labour and capital are required by all industries, but land is assumed 
useful only in agricultural production. The model is built on the Walrasian general equilibrium system, in 
which the central idea is that, all markets clear at a set of relative prices. Thus primary factors are fully-
employed at every solution. 
On the demand side, each “regional household” (a representative regional decision-maker), at the top-
most level, maximizes a Cobb–Douglas utility function constrained by a budget made up of the tax 
revenue and endowment incomes of agents residing in this region. The utility maximization behaviour 
fosters demand equations, which are constant shares of the regional household income. Each region’s 
disposable income is totally exhausted on consumption by the private households, spending by the 
                                            
8 Refer to Hertel (1997), Hertel and Tsigas (1997), and Itakura and Hertel (2001) for the details.   10
government, and savings. The incorporation of the latter helps to capture the medium-run capital 
accumulation effect of policy reforms. The utility from government spending approximates the welfare 
generated from the provision of public goods and services. The allocation of spending by the government 
across composite goods is based on a Cobb-Douglas utility function, while private household preferences 
are dictated by a constant difference of elasticities (CDE) implicit expenditure function.
9 Composite 
demand is then allocated between the imports and the domestically produced good, as well as, among 
imports at the border. 
On the supply side, firms use intermediate inputs alongside primary factors for production. The 
derived demands for inputs are based on the profit-maximizing behaviour of firms. All markets are 
assumed perfectly competitive so firms earn zero profits at the equilibrium. Production in every sector 
exhibits constant returns to scale and can be divided into two levels. First, domestic and imported 
intermediates are used to produce a composite intermediate. Demanders treat imports from different 
sources as imperfect substitutes. Primary factors (land, labour and capital) are used to produce a new item 
called value-added. This level is characterized by no substitution possibilities between the intermediate 
inputs and the primary factors of production. However, substitution is possible among the primary factors 
and among the intermediates.
10 The demands in each case are represented by a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) function. At the final stage, both the value-added and the composite intermediate are 
used to produce the final output assuming a Leontief production function. With this technology, inputs are 
required in fixed proportions and thus there is no substitutability between the value-added and composite 
intermediates (Hertel and Tsigas, 1997; Piermartini and Teh, 2005). Each region, depending on 
transportation costs, participates in the trade with other regions. 
A “global bank” ensures that the global demand for savings equals the global demand for investment 
in the post-solution equilibrium. It assembles savings and disburses investment through the sales of a 
homogenous savings commodity to regional households in order for them to purchase a composite 
investment good and hold shares in a portfolio of net regional investments (gross investment less 
depreciation). Savings and investment need not be equal at the regional level. A region saves by buying the 
                                            
9 Total differentiation of this function and use of Shephard’s Lemma allow for the derivation of the relationship between 
minimum expenditure, utility and prices. 
 
10 The imported intermediate is a composite good made up of imports distinguished by country of origin. The demand for 
imports from various sources is also characterised by a CES function.   11
savings commodity. At the same time, it produces capital goods (or invests). These goods are sold, after 
accounting for depreciation, by the global bank together with other regions’ capital goods as a portfolio in 
the form of a composite investment good. Savers claim shares in this portfolio depending on how much of 
the savings commodity they buy. In this study, we assume that the global bank’s allocation of investment 
across regions will equate the expected rates of return to capital, thus giving rise to cross-border capital 
mobility. This is a useful assumption because trade liberalisation by a region may boost the production of 
capital-intensive manufactures, thereby increasing the rate of return to capital. It can also enhance 
efficiency thus shifting upwards the economy-wide production function. Either way, with fixed saving 
rates, an income increment accumulates capital stock which translates into further income gains. This 
multiplier effect is allowed to run its course in the model. 
3.2  The GTAP Database 
Like most CGE models, our data come from published sources. The main source is GTAP 6.0 Beta 
(Release 5, Nov 2004) Data Package. The database provides disaggregated data up to 86 regions across a 
maximum of 57 sectors. All monetary values of the data are expressed in US dollar (millions) and the 
reference year is 2001. From this source, we have extracted the following data aggregated to our sectors 
and regions: (i) bilateral trade flows, (ii) bilateral protection data for merchandise trade, (iii) input/output 
(I-O) tables, (iv) factor substitution elasticities, (v) source substitution (Armington) elasticities, (vi) 
behavioural parameters for households, and (vii) factor transformation elasticities. These data originate 
from the single-country I-O tables contributed by researchers worldwide to the GTAP consortium, the UN 
COMTRADE, the IMF BOP statistics and the MAcMap database. We do not reproduce the methodology 
for building the database. See Hertel (1997) and Dimaranan and McDougall (2006) for details. 
3.3  Sectoral and Regional Aggregation 
A reduced dimension 13 x 20 aggregation of the database is used to calibrate the model. The choice of 
regional dimension is motivated by our primary focus on the FTAs concluded by Singapore, the USA and 
Japan among themselves and, as will be elaborated later, with the countries in RoW. Refer to Table 2 for 
the regional aggregations. For sectoral aggregation, we consider twenty composite clusters, of which five 
comprise services. Table 3 shows the sectoral aggregations and provides a sense of what the products are 
in each aggregate. 12 
Table 2:  Regional Aggregations Used for the Implementation 
Regions with Identifier 
Singapore [SING]  Morocco [MOR] 
United States of America [US]  Canada [CAN] 
Japan [JAP]  Mexico [MEX] 
India [IND]  Chile [CHILE] 
Australia [AUST]  South Korea [KOR] 
European Free Trade Area [EFTA]  Rest of the World [ROW] 
New Zealand [NZ]   
Source: GTAP database. 
 
Table 3:  Sectoral Aggregations Used for the Implementation 
Sectors with 
Identifier 















Paddy rice, Wheat, Cereal 
grains nec, Vegetables, 
fruit, nuts, Oil seeds, Sugar 
cane, sugar beet, Plant-
based fibers, Crops nec, 
Bovine cattle, sheep, goats, 
horses, Raw milk, Wool, 
silk-worm cocoons, Animal 




Motor vehicles & parts, 




Coal, Oil, Gas, Minerals 
nec, Ferrous metals, i.e. 









Machinery and equipment 
nec 
 
Food, beverages & 
tobacco 
[FOOD_BEV_TOB] 
Bovine meat products, Meat 
products nec, Vegetable oils 
and fats, Dairy products, 
Processed rice, Sugar, Food 









Textiles  Elec., gas & water 
[UTILITIES] 
Electricity, Water, Gas 
manufacture, Distribution 
Wearing Apparel  
[WEAR_APP] 








Trade & transport 
[TRADE_TRANS] 
Trade, Sea transport, Air 
transport, Transport nec 
Wood & Wood 
Products 
[WOOD_PROD] 
Forestry, Wood products, 
Paper products, publishing,  
Chemicals  
[CHEM] 







Financial services nec, 
Business services nec, 
Recreation and other 
services 
Petroleum & Coal 
Products 
[PETROL_COAL] 





Public Admin, Defence, 
Education, Health 
Source: GTAP database. 13 
3.4 Scenario  Design 
We consider first, a singular bilateral FTA in a group of three countries, then a hub-and-spokes system 
with one of the FTA members as a trade hub to the other two and finally, a “threesome” free trade scenario 
caused by overlapping bilateral FTAs. The agreements of primary concern that form the building blocks of 
these trading regimes are the USSFTA, JSEPA and a hypothetical FTA between Japan and the USA which 
we shall call USJFTA (in this paper, we use “EPA” and “FTA” interchangeably). Table 4 presents the 
three basic scenarios: (S1), (S2) and (S3). We also want to find out how sensitive the model results are to 
“noise” caused by Singapore, the USA and Japan serving as trade hubs to other countries in RoW. That is, 
we want to measure the welfare effect of each trading regime formed by the agreements of primary 
concern given that all the three constituents are super-hubs, and then contrast the outcomes with those 
of Scenarios 1 to 3 respectively. Scenarios 4 to 6 in Table 4 account for this “super-hub” effect. 
Figure 1 illustrates the network of FTAs involved in the analysis. 
Table 4:  Primary Scenarios and Scenarios that Account for “Super-hub” Effects 
Status  Scenario Description  of  Scenario Configuration 
USA SING  JAP 
(S1)  JSEPA only *  Single FTA  Outsider  Member  Member 
(S2)  USSFTA & JSEPA  HAS System  Spoke  Hub  Spoke 
(S3)  USSFTA, JSEPA & USJFTA  Free Trade Zone  Member  Member  Member 
(S4)  JSEPA only |  **  Single FTA  Outsider  Member  Member 
(S5)  USSFTA & JSEPA | **  HAS System  Spoke  Hub  Spoke 
(S6)  USSFTA, JSEPA & USJFTA | ** Free Trade Zone  Member  Member  Member 
Note: * Since JSEPA entered into force in November 2002 and the USSFTA in January 2004, therefore by the 
criterion of chronological order, JSEPA is chosen for the solo FTA case. | ** Conditional on the fact that 
Singapore, the USA and Japan have FTAs with other countries outside the configuration, i.e. super-hub effects.  
 
While the welfare effects of Scenarios 1 to 3 can be computed directly from the baseline data, getting the 
same information from Scenarios 4 to 6 is not so straightforward. We first find the welfare change (relative 
to the baseline) for the case where all the three countries are super-hubs independent of any FTA amongst 
them. Then we subtract this from the welfare change that results when they are super-hubs and the 
stipulated trade configuration is established. This approach allows for the evaluation of the single FTA (S1, 
S4), the HAS (S2, S5) and the free trade zone (S3, S6) comprising our three primary countries, while 
controlling for the existence of their other FTAs in the background. To shed further light on our scenario 
design, Figure 2 illustrates all six scenarios and their respective benchmarks. For Scenarios 1 to 3, the 
benchmark is simply the baseline data without any alteration. For Scenarios 4 to 6, the super-hub effect is 
accounted for in advance, forming an alternative background for analysing the three trading regimes. 14 






































Figure 2  Scenario Design 
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  FTA between spokes 
FTA between hub and spoke 
FTAs between hubs 
Links Members in a Free Trade Area  
 
Note: (*) Country is excluded from the analysis as data is not available. The figure is 
constructed based on the FTAs in force and notified to WTO as at 2006.15 
3.5  Modifications to Database: Services Trade Barriers 
The GTAP database does not provide estimates of the barriers to services trade and assumes by 
default, zero barriers. This is as good as assuming that impediments are non-existent in international 
services transactions, which is unrealistic. Many service sectors remain highly regulated, facing restrictive 
policies such as entry fee, visa requirement, discriminatory access to local distribution networks, licensing, 
environmental standards and market share restrictions. These measures are designed to limit the access of 
foreign services suppliers to the domestic markets. Although most countries in the world are bound by the 
GATS, the commitments differ significantly from one member to the other.
11 Furthermore, under Article V 
of the GATS, members are allowed to form agreements on a bilateral or plurilateral basis to further 
liberalize services trade. From Table 1, we observe that all the FTA partners in our study have some form 
of services agreement with each other under this provision. As such, it would be interesting to find out 
what happens to regional welfare in each trading regime when trade liberalisation goes beyond tariff 
elimination. To be specific, we quantify the barriers that arise from regulatory measures and use them to 
determine the welfare effects of deep economic integration. 
We adopt the methodology of Hoekman (1995) for estimating services trade barriers. Alternative 
works have since been contributed by Francois and Hoekman (1999), Kalirajan et al. (2000) and Warren 
(2000a, 2000b). However, the coverage of sectors by Hoekman (1995) is, by far, one of the most extensive 
and many CGE studies still employ these figures (McGuire, 2003; Dihel, 2003). Hoekman estimates the 
relative restrictiveness of policy regimes for services by assuming that the coverage of each nation’s GATS 
schedule of commitments is an indicator of the policy stance pursued. The higher is the coverage ratio of a 
nation’s schedule, the more liberal it is relative to other nations. Each nation’s coverage ratio is then 
related to a benchmark “guesstimate” of what the tariff equivalent of services trade barriers in the most 
protectionist nation might be in order to obtain country-specific “tariff equivalents”. The tariff equivalent 
list for the most restrictive nation is arbitrarily determined. An ad valorem rate of 200 percent applies for 
sectors where access tends to be prohibited and which do not appear in most schedules. These include air 
transport proper, postal and voice telecommunications. The rest varies between 20 and 50 percent. 
                                            
11 Refer to Footnote 6 about the GATS. Article XX of the GATS  requires from each member a schedule of specific 
commitments that defines the trade conditions for services (such as national treatment and market access), but does not 
prescribe the sector scope or the degree of liberalization. Thus, while some members limit their commitments to a handful of 
sectors, others have listed several dozens. Furthermore, any of the entries may vary between full commitment without 
limitation and full discretion to apply measures falling under the relevant GATS Article. 16 
To be useful for empirical work, Hoekman first concorded the GATS list to the International Standard 
Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC). The ad valorem “tariff equivalents” (or AVEs) 
for 49 selected GATS members are then computed. Adjustment is made so that this data fits our sectoral 
aggregation. We sum up the 2-digit weights ( j w ) of the ISIC sectors that fall within each sectoral 
aggregate  k . The share of an ISIC sector in the sectoral aggregate ( j v ) is then obtained by expressing its 
2-digit weight as a fraction of the respective sum total,  
k
j
j j j w w v | /∑ =  
where  1 | = ∑j k j v . This effectively assigns equal weights to all the 2-digit ISIC sectors in our sectoral 
aggregation. The region-specific AVE of services trade barriers for sectoral aggregate k  is then obtained 
by summing up the products between the share of each ISIC sector  j  in k  and its tariff equivalent value 
( j t ) reported in Hoekman (1995, Annex 2),
12 
k j
j j k t v t ∑ =  
Table 5 reports the AVEs for our sectoral and regional aggregations. We assume that all regions 
supplying a service face the same regulatory obstacles in an importer region. Since the services 
agreements, allowed under Article V, GATS were established before 2001 (our reference year) among the 
NAFTA members, between Canada and Chile, and between Chile and Mexico, we let the corresponding 
services trade barriers be zero in the modified database. We also assume that there are no trade barriers to 
essential services such as electricity, water and gas.  
Next, we incorporate this new set of AVEs into the GTAP database using the approach by Malcolm 
(1998). This procedure is used for changing taxes in the initial, pre-simulation GTAP database when the 
user acquires better information than that used originally for its construction, while maintaining its internal 
consistency. We shock the exogenous variable, ad valorem import tax [tms] for services from their original 
                                            
12 Due to data constraints, the figures for EFTA are approximated by the unweighted average of those for Norway and 
Switzerland. For RoW, the “tariff equivalent” of a sectoral aggregate is the unweighted average of thirty-six representative 
countries in RoW reported in Hoekman (1995). The list of countries includes large economies such as the EU and China, 
South American countries such as Argentina and Brazil, as well as, representative nations from Africa, the Middle East and 
Asia. The complete list of countries will be furnished upon request. 17 
values of zero to levels commensurate with the estimated tariff equivalents, solve a variant of the standard 
GTAP model, and use the updated database as a benchmark for subsequent counterfactual experiments. 
Table 5:  Services Trade Barriers due to Regulations (Ad Valorem Equivalent, AVE) 
Sector  SING US  JAP IND  AUST EFTA NZ MOR CAN MEX  CHILE  KOR  ROW
UTILITIES 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 
CONSTRUCTN 12.0  5.0  5.0  34.0  12.0  5.0  5.0 30.0 6.0 24.0 40.0 16.0  27.4 
TRADE  &  TRANS  60.0 43.8 42.4 61.9 46.9 45.6 50.2 59.9 41.3 52.2 60.7 54.1  56.5 
OTH_PTE_SVCS  58.2 41.0 33.7 67.0 48.4 50.2 48.0 66.1 44.6 60.8 61.4 58.3  59.4 
GOVT_SVCS  45.5 28.0 24.5 48.6 23.7 23.6 38.8 43.8 35.4 34.4 50.0 42.2 42.0 
Source: Figures constructed from Hoekman (1995). 
 
3.6  Modifications to Theory: Monopolistic Competition 
Many empirical studies have found evidence of scale economies and imperfect competition 
(Helpman, 1986; de Melo and Tarr, 1992; Tybout, 1993; Antweiler and Trefler, 2002).
13 Thus we need 
to test the robustness of our results to the variation in market structure and production technologies from 
the default GTAP settings of perfect competition and constant returns. To be succinct, we introduce scale 
economies internal to firms and “large group” monopolistic competition for all manufacturing and services 
sectors based on Francois and Roland-Horst (1997) and Francois (1998). This approach builds on the 
theoretical foundations laid by Ethier (1982), Helpman and Krugman (1985), and Venables (1987).  
We assume commodities are differentiable at the firm level in the monopolistically competitive 
sectors. Each firm in sector  j  of region i  produces a unique variety and is a monopolist in its chosen 
market niche because of less-than-perfectly elastic demand. However, varieties substitute for each other 
and, with free entry and exit, firms are forced to price at average costs (AC) and make zero profits in the 
long run. We assume that scale economies arise from fixed costs; some subset of a firm’s inputs is 
committed a priori to production and its costs must be covered regardless of the output level (Y ).  As Y  
increases, AC falls, realizing internal scale economies. The firm faces an AC function of the form, 
                                            
13 Using 1972 - 1992 data on 34 industries in 71 countries, Antweiler and Trefler (2002) found evidence of modest scale 
economies if industries are assumed to exhibit the same degree of returns to scale. When heterogeneity among industries is 
factored into the analysis, 1/3 of all industries face scale economies. de Melo and Tarr (1992, 146) demonstrated, using 
econometric and engineering estimates, that there were unexploited economies of scale in the USA steel and automobiles 
industries during the 1980s. Helpman (1987) found that, in cross-country comparisons, the larger the similarity in factor 
composition, the larger the share of intra-industry trade. In time series data, the more similar the factor composition of a 
group of countries becomes over time, the larger is the share of intra-industry trade within the group. These findings support 
the monopolistic competition model of Helpman and Krugman (1985), which predicts that much trade will be intra-industry 
when endowments are similar. Tybout (1993) attributes the welfare improvement from trade policies to imperfect market 
structures, which open the possibility that the policy will enrich product menus for consumers, shift rents between countries 
and reduce waste. In the case of services, it is usually safe to assume that sectors like utilities and transportation are run by 




AC + =  
A condition for equilibrium in the monopolistically competitive sector defined by AC-pricing, 
monopoly pricing and increasing returns at the firm level is that, the price elasticity of demand for a variety 
in that sector,  i j, ε  is related inversely to the firm’s cost disadvantage ratio (CDR), 














where  i j, α  and  i j, β  are the fixed and marginal costs of a firm respectively,  i j Y ,  is the firm’s output, and 
CDR  is a measure of the firm’s unrealised scale economies in production.
14  
We assume that the number of firms populating a monopolistically competitive sector is arbitrarily 
large. From the complete set of equilibrium conditions,  i j, ε  would be fixed and equal to the elasticity of 
substitution between varieties  j σ  (see Francois, 1998, 12). CDR  is constant as well because it is the 
inverse of  i j, ε . Firms in a sector are assumed to share the same cost function, so one set of values for 
CDR ,  i j, ε  and  j σ  per sector would suffice. A new parameter SCALE  and variable OSCALE  is 
introduced to the model. The latter is exogenous for sectors where firms compete imperfectly and face 








When trade barriers are removed, consumers and firms gain better access to foreign varieties. The resultant 
increase in demand and free entry will encourage firm participation. New entrants will not affect the size of 
incumbents since CDR  is fixed, and the industry expands as a result of an increase in the number of 
identically-sized firms.  
                                            
14  Solving the following equations simultaneously yields the equilibrium condition, 
Monopoly pricing by a firm  fi in region i :   ( ) fi fi fi fi P MC P ε / 1 / = −  
AC pricing by a firm  fi in region i :    
fi fi AC P =  
Cost function of a firm in sector  j  in region i :  
ij i j i j i j i j Pz Y x C ) ( ) ( , , , , β α + =  
Where 
ji z P  is the price of a bundle of primary and intermediate inputs, 
ji z  used by a firm in sector j  of region i .  The 
production technology for 
ji z  is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale. 19 
After modification, we calibrate the model by inferring the price-cost mark-up of each sector (
j MU ). 











= σ  
We obtain plug-in estimates of  j MU  adjusted to our sectoral aggregation from Martins, Scarpetta and 
Pilat (1996), Francois (2000) and Francois, Meijl and Tongeren (2005). The implied CDR is then used to 
compute the values for SCALE . We assume that the same set of estimates applies to all regions. Refer to 
Table 6 for the data.  
Table 6:  Parameter Estimates for “Large Group” Monopolistic Competition Modelling 
Sectoral 
Aggregates  MU  Implied CDR 
= (MU-1)/MU  ESUBD*  j σ  = 1/Implied CDR**  SCALE 
AGRICULTURE 1.00  0  2.41  -  0 
MINING 1.16  0.139  4.17  7.20  0.161 
FOOD_BEV_TOB 1.11  0.102  2.49  9.80  0.114 
TEXTILES 1.14  0.121 3.75  8.28  0.137 
WEAR_APP 1.12 0.109  3.70  9.15  0.123 
LEATH_PROD 1.15  0.129  4.05  7.74  0.148 
WOOD_PROD 1.18  0.154  3.06  6.49  0.182 
PETROL_COAL 1.14  0.120  2.10  8.32  0.137 
CHEM 1.22  0.180  3.30  5.57  0.219 
NM_MIN_PROD 1.24  0.195  2.90  5.14  0.242 
METAL_PROD 1.15  0.134  3.75  7.47  0.155 
TRANSPORT 1.17  0.143  3.15  7.01  0.166 
ELECTRONICS 1.26  0.209 4.40  4.78 0.265 
MACH_EQUIP 1.19  0.160  4.05  6.25  0.190 
OTHER_MNFCS 1.24  0.196  3.75  5.10  0.244 
UTILITIES 1.27  0.213 2.80  4.70  0.270 
CONSTRUCTN 1.27  0.213  1.90  4.70  0.270 
TRADE_TRANS 1.27  0.213  1.90  4.70  0.270 
OTH_PTE_SVCS 1.27  0.213  1.90  4.70  0.270 
GOVT_SVCS 1.27  0.213  1.90  4.70  0.270 
Sources: Column 4 is from GTAP 6.0 database and the rest are constructed based on estimates from Martins et al (1996), 
Francois (2000) and Francois et al (2005). Note: *For regional differentiation. The Armington substitution elasticities 
continue to hold in the perfectly competitive agricultural sector. However, we assume non-nested Armington structure. That 
is, ESUBD = ESUBM. ** The monopolistically competitive sectors involve firm-level product differentiation and the 
corresponding substitution elasticities are given in the fifth column. 
 
3.7 Implementation 
In our experiment, an FTA shock involves the complete elimination of all agriculture and merchandise 
tariff barriers between the members without raising tariffs against outsiders. This is in accordance with 20 
GATT Article XXIV. For cases of deep integration, services trade barriers are also completely removed. 
The source-specific ad valorem tariff (for agriculture and merchandise trade) and tariff equivalent (of 
services trade barriers) imposed by region s on region r for commodity or service i, [tms(i,r,s)] is set 
exogenous in the model and shocked to a target rate of zero for this purpose. The standard GTAP model is 
implemented and solved using Release 8.0 of the General Equilibrium Modelling Package (GEMPACK) 
software suite. In particular, we use the visual interface, RunGTAP (Version 3.40) to analyse scenarios 
under perfect competition. Windows for GEMPACK or WinGEM (Version 2.62) is used for cases where 
monopolistic competition is assumed. 
We examine each scenario twice, once assuming that all markets are characterised by perfect 
competition (PC) and constant returns (CRTS). Then we let all manufacturing and service industries face 
increasing returns (IRTS) and firms compete monopolistically (MP), but the assumptions on agriculture 
stay unchanged. We also run all scenarios thrice, once assuming that there are no pre-existing services 
trade barriers (that is, we utilise the GTAP database without adjustment). On the next run, we estimate and 
incorporate services trade barriers beforehand, but only the trade in goods is liberalised; any impact on the 
service sectors reflects the spillover effect of tariff cuts. On the third run, these built-in barriers are 
eliminated between the FTA partners to replicate deep integration. Due to the multitude of simulations 
carried out, we categorise each simulation exercise according to the underlying assumptions made. This is 
summarised in Table 7. Every exercise involves all six scenarios. 
Table 7:  List of Experiments & Underlying Model Assumptions 
Services Trade Barriers  Market Structure  Exercise 








A  No  -  PC / CRTS  All  Armington 
B  Yes  No  PC / CRTS  All  Armington 
C  Yes  Yes  PC / CRTS  All  Armington 
D  No  -  MP / IRTS  Mnfcs & Svcs  Firm-level 
 
E  Yes  No  MP / IRTS  Mnfcs & Svcs  Firm-level 
F  Yes  Yes  MP / IRTS  Mnfcs & Svcs  Firm-level 
 
4.  Model Results and Implications 
4.1  Sources of Welfare Effects 
The welfare impact on a region due to trade policy changes (either of its own or its trading partners’) 
can accrue from the changes in its terms of trade (TOT), allocative efficiency and the relative prices of 
savings and investment. A TOT gain occurs when there is an incomplete pass-through of a newly imposed 21 
tariff to domestic prices. This happens when foreign exporters absorb some of the tariff burden. The 
importer region is better off because the world price of its imports falls (in other words, its TOT improves). 
Unilateral tariff cuts work in the reverse and it suffers a TOT loss. However, when tariff liberalisation is 
reciprocal like in an FTA, the cost of imports is reduced for both trading partners and an exchange gain 
results. In addition, as industries expand in some regions and capture an increasing share of the global 
market, the same industries in other regions may shrink, thus leading to the geographical specialisation of 
activities and therefore specialisation gains. For allocative efficiency effect, the removal of distortion 
caused by tariffs re-directs the factors of production to sectors where they are valued the most. Meanwhile, 
those regions that are net suppliers of savings to the global bank will benefit from a rise in the price of 
savings, relative to investment goods. 
When we incorporate firm-level product differentiation in the model via “large group” monopolistic 
competition, regional welfare changes may also result from changes in the number of varieties that the 
consumers face (usually alluded to as “love-of-variety” effect). When an economy lifts its import tariffs, 
domestic firms’ profits fall as they enjoy less protection from their foreign counterparts. Free entry and exit 
thus becomes the means through which countries realise specialisation gains. However, the scale of 
production is assumed fixed, so firms do not enjoy the cost savings that come with realising internal scale 
economies. Such a setting is required to motivate “large group” monopolistic competition. Nonetheless, 
new entrants intensify competition, squeezing the incumbents’ mark-ups of price over marginal cost, thus 
generating some pro-competitive gains. The resultant fall in prices is beneficial to the consumers. 
4.2 Equivalent Variation 
As a measure of welfare change, we report in this section the equivalent variation (EV) that arises 
from each scenario for all the regions involved. The regional EV can be interpreted as the amount of 
income that if given to the region at the initial state, would have exactly the same effect on its welfare, as 
the move to the alternative state. If EV is positive, then the counterfactual state is preferred to the 
benchmark. We also find out the impact of the trading regimes on the world community. A global EV, 
computed as the simple summation of the regional EVs, provides us with a gauge. If global EV turns out to 
be positive, then it is hypothetically possible for those regions that stand to gain ( 0 > EV ) to compensate 
the losers using some lump-sum re-distribution scheme. Thus a potential Pareto improvement in world 
welfare is possible. The related figures are reported in Tables 8 and 9. 22 
 Table 8:  Equivalent Variation, Perfect Competition (in US$ Millions)  
EXERCISE A  EXERCISE B  EXERCISE C 
  S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 
SING  216 464 347 184 380 276 265 546 409 217 426 309  1396  2672  2154  912  1603  1205 
US -29  -102  4055 -22  -68  4105 -38 -121  4621 -27  -73  4677 -203  241  9923 -137 748  10496 
JAP -117  -126  570 -72 -78  800 -131 -144  451 -73 -80  706 -248  -415  -39 -13  -166  423 
IND    -5 -13  -80 1  1 -67 -7 -16  -91 1  2 -74  -40  -89  -218 1 -36  -176 
AUST -6  -9 -313 -4  -5 -294 -8  -12  -362 -4  -6 -338  -35 -72  -497  -22 -70  -466 
EFTA  -4 -6  -91  194  367  196  -5 -8  -105  242  445  246  -30  -72  -308  1202  1654  956 
NZ  -1 -2  -66  -1 -1  -64  -1 -2  -74  -1 -1  -71  -6  -12  -98  -4  -14  -99 
MOR -1  -1 -17 0  -1 -12 -1  -1 -19 -1  -1 -14 -2 -5 -32 -2 -5 -26 
CAN  -4  -14  -675 -3  -9 -657 -6  -19  -710 -4  -11  -690  -31  -128  -1219  -19  -117  -1194 
MEX -1 -14  -399  -3 -10  -487  -2 -16  -415  -4 -10  -513  -13  -56  -578  -12  -48  -723 
CHILE  -2 -2  -46  -1 -1  -43  -2 -2  -53  -1 -1  -49  -5 -9  -76  -3 -8  -71 
KOR  -8  -14  -439 -5  -9 -426  -10 -18  -478 -6  -10  -462  -43 -90  -638  -25 -89  -639 
ROW  -115  -270 -3256  -98  -210 -3148 -174  -380 -3834 -132  -262 -3669  -1225  -2759  -9308 -805 -1847  -8390 
WLD -76  -110  -410 170 355  178 -120 -194  -659 208 417  58 -485  -793  -932 1074 1606  1297 
    
Table 9:  Equivalent Variation, Monopolistic Competition (in US$ Millions)  
EXERCISE D  EXERCISE E  EXERCISE F 
  S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 
SING  2589 2648 1555 2121 2144 1316 4177 4242 2349 3120 3158 1902 4550 5086 3708 2911 3353 2577 
US -1175  -1162  2286 -280 -220  3296 -1230 -1251  3530 -287 -371  4639 -1061  131  11920 -435  997  12603 
JAP -1304  -1307  2890 -829 -844  3599 -1686 -1674  2511 -894 -889  3464 -1061 -925  9332 -325 -281  10124 
IND   -97  -98  -80  51  43  29  -156  -159  -129  18  -3  7  -156  -170  -164  82  -31  -204 
AUST  -161  -172  -70 -57 -90 53 -269  -267  -204  -91 -75 -66  -297  -229  -79 -70 -96  65 
EFTA -149 -146 -232 -750 -735 -520 -181 -181 -301 -764 -764 -546 -171 -179 -379 -710 -685 -572 
NZ  -22 -23 -10  -4  -9  9  -36 -36 -27  -9  -7  -8  -40 -31 -11  -6 -15  -5 
MOR  -105 -107 -107  -4  -7  -11  -131 -131 -133  -6  -5  -17  -131 -121  -83  -43  -36  3 
CAN  -8  5  -211 -30  4  -260 -13  -15 -149 -32  -55 -164 40  -33 -169 -61 -48 -196 
MEX  3  5  -282 -82  -62 -590 15  10 -205 -77  -91 -566 41  -10 -226 -89 -72 -569 
CHILE  -15 -15 -41  -8  -9  -30 -22 -22 -53 -10 -11 -38 -18 -19 -55 -11 -10 -36 
KOR  141  -45 -737 257 -380  29  -415 -364 -968 -352  77 -1295  -1311  -106 -734 269 -75 -687 
ROW  -4587 -4441 -1449 -2930 -2285 -1705 -7525 -7592 -4822 -3166 -3477 -2296 -6851 -6668 -2649 -3749 -3009 -2065 
WLD -4891  -4857  3512 -2545 -2449  5214 -7471 -7438  1398 -2551 -2513  5015 -6463  -3274  20412 -2235  -8  21038 23 
Three observations prove robust regardless of the market structure, depth of economic integration and 
presence of super-hub effects. First, Singapore enjoys positive welfare gains relative to the benchmark 
regardless of the trading regime the country is in. Second, hub status generates the highest welfare gain for 
Singapore. Third, when both are relegated to spoke status, Japan loses more than the USA. As expected, 
most of the trading partners having FTAs with these three countries are worse off when some 
discriminatory trade pact is formed among the latter. The situation is especially detrimental with a 
USJFTA. Results also suggest that the world is likely to lose with the HAS formation but the costs can be 
minimised if the integration is deep. The outcome is more promising for the free trade zone scenario 
especially if services trade is liberalised as well. 
4.3 Sectoral  Outputs 
To have a grasp of the industry-level effect, we report in Tables 10 and 11 the changes in sectoral 
output arising from the HAS and free trade zone respectively. These are the trade configurations which we 
would expect in a world of overlapping FTAs. For brevity sake, we restrict our analysis in this paper to 
perfect competition cases.
15 For ease of reference, the figures of the top five producing merchandise 
sectors in each region are shaded grey. Substantial changes in excess of 1 percent benchmark output are 
highlighted in bold print. 
4.3.1 Hub-and-Spokes 
In an asymmetric case such as ours, the sectoral effects are acute in the small economy and 
insignificant in the hegemonies. Even if integration is deep, the impact on industries in Japan and the USA 
remains negligible. We also observe that the “super-hub” effect tends to dilute the impact of the trading 
regime (compare Scenarios 2 and 5). For Singapore, we observe a shift toward services and certain types 
of manufactures. Productions increase significantly for food, beverages and tobacco, textiles, wearing 
apparel, leather products, construction, trade and transportation, as well as, other private services. In 
particular, the wearing apparel industry experiences the biggest two-digit growth between 18 to 42 percent 
of benchmark output. However, manufacturing sectors such as chemicals, electronics, and machinery and 
equipment display much bigger declines in output than under shallow integration. Overall, the HAS 
formation lowers the output of electronics by 0.9 to 3.8 percent, machinery and equipment by 1.2 to 14.6 
percent, and chemicals by up to 16.6 percent. The metal products and transportation equipment industries
                                            
15 Model results for the single FTA scenario and monopolistic competition cases will be furnished upon request. 24 
 
Table 10:  Change in Sectoral Output, Hub-and-Spokes (Percentage of Benchmark) 
   EXERCISE A  EXERCISE B  EXERCISE C 
  S2 S5 S2 S5 S2 S5 
    SING US  JAP SING US  JAP SING US  JAP SING US  JAP SING US  JAP SING US  JAP 
AGRICULTURE  0  0 0  0  0 0 -0.1 0 0  0  0 0 -1.7  0 0 -1.3  0 0 
MINING  -2.3  0 0  -2  0 0 -2.8  0 0 -2.4  0 0 -17.2  -0.1 0  -11.3  -0.1 0 
FOOD_BEV_TOB  16.6  0  -0.1  12.6  0  -0.1  16.7  0  -0.1  12.1  0  0  7.1  0  -0.1  7.2  0  0 
TEXTILES  18  -0.1 0  15.3  0 0 16.6  -0.1 0  14.1  0 0  0.6  -0.2  0  6.1  -0.2 -0.1 
WEAR_APP  42  -0.1 0  32.5  0 0 40.5  -0.1 0  28.4  0 0  18  -0.1 0  18.6  -0.1 0 
LEATH_PROD  13.8  0 -0.1 10.5  0 0 13.2  0 -0.1  9.3  0 0 -11.4  -0.1 -0.1  0  -0.2 -0.1 
WOOD_PROD  -1.1  0 0 -0.8 0 0 -1.4  0 0 -0.9 0 0 -11.5  0 0  -6  0 0 
PETROL_COAL  0.8 0  0 0.8 0  0 0.7 0  0 0.7 0  0 -0.6 0 0  0 0  0 
CHEM  0.3  0  0  0.2  0  0  -0.3  0  0  -0.2  0  0  -16.6  -0.1  0.1  -9  -0.1  0 
NM_MIN_PROD -0.5 0 0 -0.4 0 0 -0.8 0 0 -0.5 0 0 -9.4  -0.1 0  -4.5  -0.1 0 
METAL_PROD  -0.4 0 0 -0.4 0 0 -0.7 0 0 -0.6 0 0 -10.8  0 0  -6  -0.1 0 
TRANSPORT  -2.1  0  0  -1.4  0  0 -2.6 0  0  -1.5  0  0  -15.7  0  0.1  -7.4  -0.1  0 
ELECTRONICS  -1  0  0  -0.9 0 0  -1.2  0  0  -1  0  0  -3.8  -0.1  0.1  -2.1  -0.2  0 
MACH_EQUIP  -1.5  0  0  -1.2  0  0  -2.1  0  0  -1.5  0  0  -14.6  -0.1  0.1  -7.8  -0.1  0 
OTHER_MNFCS  -1.5  0 0 -0.5  -0.1  0 -1.9  0 0 -0.6  -0.1  0 -8.8  -0.1 0  -2.2  -0.6 -0.1 
UTILITIES  1  0 0  0.4  0 0  0.9  0 0  0.3  0 0 -2.8  0 0 -1.4  0 0 
CONSTRUCTN  0.7 0  0 0.5 0  0 0.9 0  0 0.5 0  0 6.1  0 0  3.1  0 0 
TRADE_TRANS -0.3 0 0 -0.2 0 0 -0.3 0 0 -0.1 0 0  2.7  0 0  0.9  0 0 
OTH_PTE_SVCS  -1.1  0 0 -0.6 0 0  -1  0 0 -0.4 0 0  6.9  0 -0.1  3.2  0.1 0 








Table 11:  Change in Sectoral Output, Free Trade Zone (Percentage of Benchmark) 
   EXERCISE A  EXERCISE B  EXERCISE C 
  S3 S6 S3 S6 S3 S6 
    SING US  JAP SING US  JAP SING US  JAP SING US  JAP SING US  JAP SING US  JAP 
AGRICULTURE -0.7  2.8 -5.7  -0.7  2.7 -5.6  -0.8  2.9 -5.7  -0.8  2.8 -5.6  -2.2  2.6 -5.6  -1.9  2.6 -5.5 
MINING  -1.9  -0.7 0.7  -1.7  -0.6 0.7  -2.3  -0.7 0.8  -2  -0.7 0.7  -15.1 -1.6 1.4  -9.6  -1.6 1.2 
FOOD_BEV_TOB  7.8  2.3  -2.4  6  2.3  -2.3  7.8  2.5  -2.4  5.7  2.4  -2.3  0.4  2.4  -2.4  2.1  2.3  -2.2 
TEXTILES  18.2  -0.6  1.3 15.5  -0.6  1.3 17  -0.7  1.3 14.4  -0.6  1.3 2.9  -1.5  1.6 7.8  -1.5  1.5 
WEAR_APP  43  -0.2 0  33.3  -0.2 0  41.8  -0.3 0  29.3  -0.2 0  21.8  -0.8 0.1  21.1  -0.8 0.1 
LEATH_PROD  13.9  0.5 0.7  10.5  0.5 0.8  13.4  0.5 0.8  9.3  0.5 0.8  -9  -0.7 0.9  1.4  -0.8 0.8 
WOOD_PROD  -1  -0.1 -0.2  -0.7  -0.1 -0.2  -1.3  -0.1 -0.2  -0.8  -0.1 -0.2  -10.4  -0.4 -0.1  -5.2  -0.4 -0.2 
PETROL_COAL  0.8 0  -0.1  0.8 0  -0.1  0.8 0  -0.1  0.8 0  -0.1  -0.4 -0.1  -0.1  0.1 -0.1  -0.1 
CHEM  0.8  -0.4  0.6  0.6  -0.4  0.6  0.3  -0.5  0.6  0.3  -0.5  0.6  -14.2  -1.2  1.1  -7.1  -1.2  1 
NM_MIN_PROD  -0.7 -0.3  0.4  -0.5 -0.3  0.4  -0.9 -0.4  0.4  -0.5 -0.4  0.4  -8.6  -0.9 0.7  -4  -0.9 0.6 
METAL_PROD  -0.5 -0.3  0.5  -0.4 -0.3 0.4  -0.8  -0.4 0.4  -0.6  -0.4 0.4  -9.7  -0.9 0.8  -5.2  -0.9 0.7 
TRANSPORT  -1.8  -0.7  2.6 -1.1  -0.7  2.6 -2.1  -0.8  2.6 -1.1  -0.8  2.5 -13.9  -1.3  3.3 -6  -1.3  3.1 
ELECTRONICS  -0.7  -1.1  0.3  -0.6  -1  0.3  -0.9  -1.2  0.4  -0.7  -1.2  0.3  -2.5 -2.8  1.1  -1  -2.9  1 
MACH_EQUIP  -1.1  -0.8  1.3  -0.8  -0.8  1.2  -1.5  -0.9  1.3  -1  -0.9  1.2  -12.5  -1.8  2.2  -5.9  -1.9  2.1 
OTHER_MNFCS  -1.2  -0.7 0.5  -0.4  -0.6 0.5  -1.6  -0.8 0.5  -0.4  -0.7 0.5  -7.1 -2  0.7  -1.7 -2.2  0.6 
UTILITIES 0.9  0.1  0.1 0.3 0.1  0.1 0.8 0.1 0.1  0.2  0.1 0.1  -2.5  -0.1 0.2  -1.3  -0.1 0.2 
CONSTRUCTN 0.5  0.1  0  0.3  0.1 0  0.6  0.1 0  0.3  0.1 0  5.2  0.2 0.1  2.6  0.2 0.1 
TRADE_TRANS -0.2 0 0 -0.1 0 0 -0.2 0 0  0  0 0  2.6  0.2 0.1  0.9  0.2 0.1 
OTH_PTE_SVCS  -0.9 0 0 -0.4 0 0 -0.8 0 0 -0.3 0 0  6  0.3 -0.5  2.6  0.3 -0.5 







are also adversely affected. These sectors contract in Singapore because, following tariff liberalisation, 
participant countries specialise their production. This is evident in the expansion of American and Japanese 
industries whose counterparts in Singapore shrank, and vice versa. When services trade is liberalised as 
well, these manufacturing industries contract further because the reduction in regulatory barriers renders 
services trade more profitable and service providers can entice skilled labour, which they use intensively, 
with higher pay. For example, chemicals include, at a more disaggregated level, pharmaceuticals, which 
are skilled labour-intensive. When these resources are diverted to services, chemical output falls. 
4.3.2  Free Trade Zone 
Compared to the HAS, the increase in the production of food, beverages and tobacco is at least halved, 
but contraction is also smaller in the electronics, machinery and equipment, and transportation equipment 
sectors. Apart from what have been mentioned, the sectoral outcome for Singapore in the free trade zone is 
similar to that under the HAS. For example, the expansion of the textiles, wearing apparel and leather 
product industries found in the HAS are preserved. Deep integration through the USJFTA benefits the 
construction, trade and transport services in both the USA and Japan, harms (aid) the major manufacturing 
sectors in the USA (Japan) and benefits (hurts) the American (Japanese) agricultural, food, beverage and 
tobacco, and private services sectors. For example, agricultural output in the USA expands by 2.6 to 2.9 
percent, but the same economic activity in Japan contracts. The USJFTA thus causes further specialisation 
in production among the members. 
4.4  Real Returns to Primary Factors 
We report in Tables 12 and 13 the changes in real return to primary factors arising from the HAS and 
free trade zone respectively for perfect competition cases. In Singapore, the workers (both skilled and 
unskilled) and capital owners will always gain in both trade regimes, while natural resources always lose. 
In most scenarios, landowners lose as well. When services trade is not liberalised, unskilled labour and 
capital will gain the most on average in the HAS (0.5 percent to 0.7 percent increase in benchmark real 
returns). When services trade is liberalised as well, the real returns to unskilled labour rises by more than 
6.1 percent, while skilled labour and capital would gain as much as, if not more than, unskilled labour (6.1 
percent to 7.6 percent increase). The increases in real returns are comparatively smaller and the losses, 
bigger under the free trade zone scenario. Meanwhile, the HAS system has little impact on the primary 
factors employed in Japan and the USA. However, the landowners in the USA are better off (17 percent to27 
 Table 12:  Change in Real Return to Primary Factors, Hub-and-Spokes (Percentage of Benchmark) 
   EXERCISE A  EXERCISE B  EXERCISE C 
  S2 S5 S2 S5 S2 S5 
    T  UL SL  K NR  T  UL SL  K NR  T  UL SL  K NR T UL  SL K NR T UL  SL K NR T UL  SL K NR 
SING  0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 -0.4 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 -0.6 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.7 -0.9 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.5 -0.7 -6.9 7.1 7.6 7.4 -10 -2  6.1 6.1 6.1 -4.1 
US  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  -0.2 0 0 0  -0.1 -0.3 0 0 0  -0.2 
JAP  -0.2 0 0 0  -0.1  -0.1  0 0 0  -0.1 -0.2 0 0 0  -0.1 -0.1  0 0 0  -0.1 -0.1 0 0 0  -0.1 -0.1 0 0 0  -0.1 
IND    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0.1  0.1  0  -0.1 -0.1  0.3 
AUST 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0.1  0 0 0  0.1  0.3  0 0 0  0.3 
EFTA 0 0 0 0 0  -0.2  0 0 0  -0.2 0 0 0 0 0  -0.2  0 0 0  -0.2 0 0 0 0  0.1  -0.4 0.1  0.1  0.1  -0.5 
NZ  -0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  -0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0.1  0 0 0  0.1  0.4  0  -0.1 0  0.3 
MOR  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0.2  0.1  0 0 0  0.1 
CAN  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0.1  0 0 0  0.1  0.1  0 0 0  0.1 
MEX  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CHILE    -0.1 0 0 0 0  -0.1  0 0 0 0  -0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  -0.1 0 0 0  0.1  0 0 0 0  0.1 
KOR  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0.1 
ROW  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0.1  0 0 0 0  0.1 
 
Table 13:  Change in Real Return to Primary Factors, Free Trade Zone (Percentage of Benchmark) 
  EXERCISE A  EXERCISE B  EXERCISE C 
S3 S6 S3 S6 S3 S6 
   T UL  SL  K  NR T UL  SL  K  NR T UL  SL K  NR T UL  SL K  NR T UL  SL K  NR  T UL  SL K  NR 
SING  -5.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 -4.5  -4  0.4 0.4 0.4  -3.6 -5.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 -4.9 -3.9 0.5 0.4 0.4 -3.5 -11 6.5  6.9 6.8 -13  -5.1 5.6 5.5 5.6  -5.8 
US  18 0  -0.1  0.1  -0.5  18 0 0 0  -0.5 18.8  0  -0.1 0.1 -0.6 18.8  0  0 0.1 -0.6 17.2 0.1  0.1 0.2  -2.1 17 0.1 0.1 0.2  -2.1 
JAP  -27 0.5 0.6  0.5 -20 -26 0.5 0.6  0.5  -19 -26 0.5  0.6 0.5 -19 -26 0.5  0.6 0.5 -19 -26 0.8 0.9 0.8 -19 -25 0.8 0.9 0.8 -19 
IND    -0.2 0  0  0 0.1  -0.2 0  0  0 0.1  -0.2 0  0 0 0.1  -0.2 0  0 0 0.1  -0.1 0  0  0 0.3  -0.1 0 -0.1 -0.1  0.5 
AUST -5.1  -0.1 0 -0.1  1.2  -5 -0.1 0  0  1.1  -5  -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 1.4 -4.9 -0.1  0 -0.1 1.2 -4.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 1.8 -4.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 1.6 
EFTA  -2.2 0  0  0 -0.1  -2.3 0  0  0  -0.2 -2.2 0  0 0  -0.1 -2.3 0  0 0  -0.2 -2 -0.1 0  0 0.3  -2.2 0.1  0.1 0 -0.1 
NZ  -5.5 -0.1  0  0  -0.5 -5.3 -0.1  0  0  -0.5 -5.4 -0.1 0  0  -0.4 -5.2 -0.1  0  0 -0.4 -4.7 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0  -4.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 
MOR -0.7  -0.1 0  0 0.1  -0.5  -0.1 0  0 0.1  -0.7  -0.1 0 0 0.1  -0.5 -0.1  0  0  0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.7 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.6 
CAN  -0.3 -0.1 -0.1  -0.1 0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.5 -0.4 -0.1  -0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.8 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.7 
MEX  2.8 -0.1  -0.1  -0.1 0.4 2.2 -0.1  -0.1 -0.1 0.6 2.9 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.4  2.3  -0.1  -0.1 -0.1 0.6  3.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.4 2.6 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.8 
CHILE    -1.2 -0.1  0  0  0.1 -1.1 -0.1  0  0  0.1 -1.2 -0.1 -0.1 0  0.2 -1.1 -0.1 0  0 0.1  -1 -0.1 -0.1 0  0.4  -0.9 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 
KOR -1.6 0  0 0  -1.1  -1.5 0  0 0 -1  -1.5 0 0 0 -1  -1.5 0 0 0 -1  -1.4  -0.1 -0.1 0  -0.9 -1.4 -0.1 -0.1 0  -0.8 
ROW  -0.8  0 0 0 0  -0.7  0 0 0 0  -0.7  0 0  0 0  -0.7  0 0  0 0  -0.6  0 0  -0.1 0.3  -0.5 0 0  -0.1  0.3 
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18.8 percent increase in real returns) and those in Japan are worse off (25.4 percent to 26.5 percent 
decrease) following the USJFTA, while the returns on natural resources fall in both countries. 
5. Sensitivity  Analysis 
Results from simulation models are sometimes highly dependent on the values employed for 
exogenous variables such as substitution elasticities and policy distortions like taxes. In GTAP, the values 
of key economic parameters in the disaggregated database are derived from a survey of econometric work. 
Such estimates are most appropriately viewed as random. To address this issue, we conduct formal 
systematic sensitivity analysis (SSA) using the multivariate order-three Gaussian Quadrature (GQ) 
procedure (see Arndt, 1996; Stroud, 1957; DeVuyst and Preckel, 1997). It is more efficient than a Monte 
Carlo approach because it requires much less information and solves of the model and is more systematic 
than an ad hoc analysis. 
SSA is conducted for the primary scenarios, and involves the GTAP supply-side parameters: 
elasticities of substitution between the primary factors (ESUBVA), between domestic and imported goods 
or inputs (ESUBD) and between the valued added by primary factors and composite intermediate 
(ESUBT), as well as, factor mobility across sectors (ETRAE). On the demand side, we vary the own-price 
and income elasticities of consumer demand (SUBPAR and INCPAR respectively). We also extend SSA 
to shocks caused by the FTAs of primary concern. We originally assumed 100 percent tariff cuts on a 
reciprocal basis. These “simplified” shocks closely approximate what was actually agreed. Furthermore, 
100 percent tariff cuts are in accordance with WTO regulations on FTAs. Thus we view the liberalisation 
of merchandise trade through USSFTA and JSEPA as “a matter of fact” and not subjected to sensitivity 
analysis. However, since USJFTA is hypothetical, the extent of liberalisation is uncertain. We also 
assumed that the services agreements abolish regulatory barriers totally, but this is unlikely. Taking these 
considerations into account, the SSA involves varying tariff cuts for USJFTA and, where applicable, 
uncertainty is factored in on the extent of services trade liberalisation achieved by each agreement. 
An arbitrary but plausible bound of maximum 30 percent variation from the original value is imposed 
for each element in INCPAR, SUBPAR, ESUBVA, ESUBD and FTA shock per sensitivity solve. For the 
latter, this bound applies both ways between members. Since ETRAE and ESUBT have zero entries, we 
allow a maximum variation of 0.5 in absolute terms. For simplicity, we let the variations of substitution 29 
elasticities be perfectly correlated across sectors, and for ETRAE, across endowments. The demand 
elasticities will also vary together across sectors and regions. Taking into consideration that tariff cuts may 
differ between sectors, we allow them to vary independently of each other. The same applies for services 
trade liberalisation. In Table 14, we report the estimates of the mean 
EV μ ˆ  and standard deviation 
EV σ ˆ  of 
EV for Singapore. The 95% confidence intervals (C.I.) are constructed using Chebyshev’s Inequality 
( Y Y σ μ ˆ 5 . 4 ˆ − , Y Y σ μ ˆ 5 . 4 ˆ + ). This method of determining C.I. does not require any assumptions about the 
distribution of EV. However, the C.I. computed this way is wider than if we knew its distribution. They 
should thus be treated as conservative estimates.  
Contrary to our model results, the 95% C.I.s indicate that a HAS with deep integration can be welfare 
reducing for Singapore. This is a crucial discovery because many recent agreements such as the JSEPA are 
moving toward deeper integration compared to their predecessors. Keeping in mind that the C.I. is a 
conservative estimate, we find this implication reversed at the 90% level of confidence. Otherwise, our 
simulation results prove robust to the variations in exogenous variables. 
6 Concluding  Remarks 
Our findings highlight the importance of hub-and-spokes as a trading system in a world of overlapping free 
trade agreements. Our study indicates that small and open economies like Singapore prefer hub status to a 
free trade zone involving the same country group. They are not likely to stop at one agreement once they 
embark on the FTA path. Although FTAs especially those with deep integration can be attractive, 
significant changes in industrial composition (due to specialisation in production) can lead to temporary 
spells of frictional unemployment. This is not captured in our experiment. Furthermore, although Japan 
suffers more than the USA in a HAS centred on Singapore, this is not sufficient to kickstart negotiations 
for a spoke-spoke FTA because their welfare losses are insignificant when expressed in percentages of 
benchmark GDPs. While this may be expected of small country-large country FTA per se, being spokes to 
multiple HAS may tip the balance in favour of an USA-Japan EPA in the future. Already, Japan and the 
USA are spokes in another HAS centred on Mexico and more will materialise as the two continue to 
pursue the FTA path. 30 
 Table 14   Systematic Sensitivity Analysis: Equivalent Variation (Singapore) 




EV μ ˆ   EV σ ˆ   95% C.I.    EV μ ˆ   EV σ ˆ   95% C.I.    EV μ ˆ   EV σ ˆ   95% C.I.  90% C.I. 
S1  -  -  -   -  -  -    1403 384 (-323,  3130) (190,  2617) 
S2  -  -  -    -  -  -    2647  599  (-47, 5341)  (754, 4540) 
FTA Shock 
S3  347  12  (295, 399)    408  14  (344, 473)    2492  551  (13, 4970)  (750, 4233) 
S1  216  0  (215, 218)    265  0  (264, 267)    1396  0  (1395, 1396)  (1395, 1396) 
S2  464  0  (464, 464)    546  0  (545, 546)    2672  1  (2668, 2677)  (2670, 2675) 
ESUBVA 
S3  347  1  (345, 349)    408  1  (405, 412)    2155  1  (2152, 2157)  (2153, 2156) 
S1  218  8  (181, 255)    267  12  (213, 321)    1403  57  (1149, 1658)  (1224, 1582) 
S2  467  8  (431, 502)    549  13  (491, 608)    2698  96  (2265.9, 3129)  (2394, 3001) 
ESUBD 
S3  348  1  (344, 353)    410  1  (406, 415)    2172  21  (2078, 2266)  (2106, 2238) 
S1  217  15  (148, 287)    267  19  (183, 350)    1404  100  (953, 1856)  (1087, 1722) 
S2  467  32  (322, 612)    549  38  (380, 714)    2691  222  (1691, 3691)  (1988, 3394) 
ESUBT 
S3  349  23  (246, 452)    411  27  (290, 532)    2172  194  (1299, 3044)  (1559, 2784) 
S1  216  0  (216, 216)    265  0  (265, 265)    1396  0  (1395, 1396)  1395, 1396) 
S2  464  0  (464, 464)    546  0  (545, 546)    2672  0  (2672, 2673)  (2672, 2673) 
ETRAE 
S3  347  0  (345, 349)    409  0  (407, 411)    2155  0  (2153, 2156)  (2153, 2156) 
S1  216  0  (216, 216)    265  0  (265, 265)    1396  0  (1395.6, 1395.6)  (1396, 1396) 
S2  464  0  (464, 464)    546  0  (546, 546)    2672  0  (2672.4, 2672.4)  (2672, 2672) 
INCPAR 
S3  347  0  (347, 347)    409  0  (409, 409)    2154  0  (2154.4, 2154.4)  (2154, 2154) 
S1  216  1  (213, 219)    265  1  (261, 270)    1396  5  (1375.1, 1416.1)  (1381, 1410) 
S2  464  1  (458, 471)    546  2  (536, 555)    2672  8  (2636.5, 2708.3)  (2647, 2698) 
SUBPAR 
S3  347  1  (343, 352)    409  1  (402, 415)    2154  6  (2125.4, 2183.5)  (2134, 2175) 
Source: SSA output is obtained via RunGTAP.  31 
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